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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University

This article examines the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Double jeopardy issues can be divided into two general categories. First, the meaning of the term "same offense" raises a number of issues, such as the dual sovereign doctrine
and the criminal-civil law distinction. See 2 Katz & Giannelli,
Ohio Criminal Law chs. 72 & 73 (1996). Second, the term
"twice in jeopardy" raises another series of issues. T[lis article focuses on these latter issues. A future article will examine the former issues.
OVERVIEW
Acquittals. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial if
there has been a jury verdict of acquittal or its functional
equivalent, such as a directed verdict (Criminal Rule 29) by
the trial court or a reversal of a conviction by an appellate
. court for insufficient evidence. Implied acquittals involve sit~' Jations where the accused is found guilty of a lesser included offense; this result precludes retrial on the greater offense.
Dismissals. In contrast, a dismissal on legal grounds
unrelated to guilt or innocence will not preclude a retrial.
Mistrials. A reprosecution following a mistrial is permitted if (1) the defense requested the mistrial (unless the
request was cause by the prosecution with the intent to
provoke a mistrial), or (2) there is a "manifest necessity." The
term "manifest necessity" is not a self-defining term and covers a wide gambit of circumstances, including hung juries,
defective indictments, defense misconduct, and so forth.
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
When the United States Supreme Court applied the double jeopardy prohibition to the states in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), it did not specifically establish the point
in time when jeopardy attaches. The Court had held in federal cases that jeopardy attached in jury trials when the jury
is sworn and in bench trials when the first witness is sworn.
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). After Benton,
it was unclear whether states would be free to select a different time in the proceedings.
In 1978, the Court confronted this issue in Crist v. Bretz,
437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978), holding that the federal rule- jeop-
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ardy attaches when the jury is sworn- is binding on the
states. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the purpose of the prohibition, which is not simply to prevent double convictions and
multiple punishments for the same offense but also multiple
trials. The federal rule promotes "minimization of hamssing
exposure to the harrowing experience of a criminal trial, and
the valued right to continue with the chosen jury:' As Justice
Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion, the federal
rule also prevents ''the possibility of prosecutorial overreaching in the opening statement" and minimizes the possibility
that an innocent defendant may be convicted. /d. at 39.
Pretrial Rulings
Since jeopardy does not attach until the jury is sworn (or
until evidence is introduced in a bench trial), the state is free
to appeal all pretrial rulings, suppression motions, and dismissals favorable to the defendant. If these rulings are reversed on appeal, the prosecution may then proceed to trial.
See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) ("an
accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double
jeopardy"); State v. Larabee, 69 Ohio St.3d 357, 359, 632
N.E.2d 511 (1994) ("By applying Serfass to the case before
us, we conclude that jeopardy did not attach when the trial
court granted the appellee's [pretrial] motion to dismiss the
indictment.").
Guilty Pleas
If the defendant pleads guilty, jeopardy generally attaches when the court accepts the plea unconditionally. 3
LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 24.1(c), at 64 (1984).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), recognizes a limitation.
Johnson was indicted for murder, involuntary manslaughter,
aggravated robbery, and grand theft. At arraignment, the
defe'ndant offered to plead guilty to the manslaughter and
theft counts. Over the prosecution's objection, the trial court
accepted the pleas and dismissed the remaining counts on
double jeopardy grounds, finding that manslaughter and
theft were lesser included offenses of murder and robbery.
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld this decision. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court,
the multiple prosecution aspect of the Double Jeopardy
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States v. Jorn, 400 u.s. 470, 480 (1971 ).
For more than a century after Perez, appellate courts
seemed to affirm trial judges' findings of manifest necessity
without close scrutiny. For example, in Gori v. United States,
367 U.S. 364 (1961), the Supreme Court affirmed a convic- p
tion obtained at a second trial after the judge at the first trial:;
had declared a mistrial sua sponte when he determined that
the prosecutor's questioning of a witness was calculated to
inform the jury of the defendant's prior convictions. The
Court was unwilling to review the mistrial ruling because it
had been granted solely in the defendant's interest.
A decade later, in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470
(1971 ), the Court scrutinized the trial court's decision more
carefully, finding that the trial judge abused his discretion
when he made a sua sponte decision to declare a mistrial.
That case involved prosecution for willful assistance in the
preparation of fraudulent income tax returns. The government's witnesses were taxpayers who had been assisted by
the defendant in preparing these returns. The trial judge advised the first witness, upon suggestion of defense counsel,
of his privilege against self-incrimination. The witness indicated a willingness to testify and informed the trial judge
that he had been advised of his rights by the IRS. The trial
judge did not believe that the witness had been proper-ly informed of his rights and, after learning that the other four
witnesses were likewise uninformed, immediately declared
a mistrial so that the witnesses could confer with attorneys.
The trial court provided no opportunity for the prosecutor to
suggest a continuance for the legal consultations, nor was
the defendant given an opportunity to object to the mistrial.
The Supreme Court held that the judge must consider alternatives before aborting a trial. Only in the absence of alteri
natives can there be a manifest necessity for a mistrial.
The court of appeals found that there were alternatives in
Cleveland v. Walters, 98 Ohio App.3d 165, 648 N.E.2d 37
(1994), when it became clear during the reading of the jury's
verdict that the jury had physically delivered the wrong verdict to the court. As the verdict was read, the members of
the jury called out. The defense attorney asked that the jury
be polled, and the jurors unanimously announced that the
verdict read was not theirs. The trial court found that the jurors' statement of an unanimous verdict in open court before
delivering a proper written verdict created a manifest necessity for a mistrial because no one should be aware of their
actions during deliberations. The appellate court concluded
that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial because
the court should have sent the jury back to resolve the apparent error.
There are two types of mistrials: (1) defense requested
mistrials and (2) all others (those requested by the prosecution or declared by the judge).

Clause would not be violated in this context. The defendant
had never been exposed to conviction on the more serious
charges; the prosecution was not seeking a second chance
at conviction; and the plea of guilty could not be considered
an implied acquittal of the more serious charges.

Plea Agreements
The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987),
was charged with first degree murder. He pleaded guilty to
second degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain, in which
he agreed to testify against two other defendants. The
agreement provided that "(s]hould the defendant refuse to
testify or should he at any time testify untruthfully ... then
this entire agreement is null and void and the original
charge will be automatically reinstated." /d. at 4. The trial
court accepted the plea but withheld sentencing. Adamson
testified against the other defendants, who were convicted
of first degree murder. He was then sentenced. The convictions of the other defendants, however, were reversed on
appeal, and Adamson refused to testify at the retrial. He
claimed that his obligation to testify under the agreement
ended when he was sentenced. The prosecution considered his refusal to testify as a breach of the agreement,
and Adamson was subsequently tried, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. In a federal habeas
proceeding, the federal appellate court ruled that his double
jeopardy rights had been violated.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court
acknowledged that absent special circumstances, the
Double Jeopardy Clause would bar prosecution for first degree murder because second degree murder was a lesser
included offense. According to the Court, the special circumstances were Adamson's waiver of his double jeopardy
claim. The Court believed that the agreement was clear;
should Adamson not testify after pleading guilty to second
degree murder, the agreement was void, and he could be
tried for first degree murder. This agreement necessarily involved a waiver of double jeopardy rights.

\
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MISTRIALS: IN GENERAL
The earliest justification for the development of a double
jeopardy doctrine in England and in this country was the
premise that defendants should be protected against multiple convictions and punishments. American law has incorporated into the Double Jeopardy Clause the right to averdict from the first tribunal to hear the case. However, this
right is not absolute; unforeseen circumstances sometimes
prevent a trial from being completed fairly. In an 1824 case,
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824), the United
States Supreme Court stated, "We think ... the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a
jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated."
Similarly, in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949),
the Court stated that "a defendant's valued right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials
designed to end in just judgments:' Even the Warren Court
opposed a rigid rule that would automatically bar retrial
whenever a jury is discharged without a defendant's consent. The Court recognized that a rigid rule "would be too
high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from government harassment." United

DEFENSE REQUESTED MISTRIALS
The United States Supreme Court has never been willing
to accept a rigid rule that would automatically bar retrial
under any circumstance following a mistrial, holding, instead, that in most instances a mistrial granted with the consent or on the motion of a defendant does not bar retrial
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), the Court recognized that this
created a Hobson's choice for the defendant between giving
up the first jury or continuing a tainted trial. That choice was
deemed acceptable, however, because the defendant retains primary control over the course of events - continuing
2

a trial that may be tainted by prejudicial error or having a
new trial with another jury. This assumes, of course, that
the trial court is willing to consider alternatives for curing an
error before the defendant is forced to seek a mistrial.

(1984), acquitted the defendant of one count but could not
agree on other counts. The trial court therefore declared a
mistrial, and the defendant claimed that a second trial on
the remaining counts would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause because the evidence on the remaining counts was
insufficient for conviction. The defendant relied on Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), in which the Supreme
Court had held that if a defendant obtained an appellate ruling that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
convict, a second trial was precluded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. In short, a finding of insufficient evidence
is equivalent to an acquittal. The Supreme Court, however,
refused to extend Burks to the defendant's case. Instead,
the Court adhered to its long established rule that a retrial
following a hung jury does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See also State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St. 3d 440, 683
N.E. 2d 1112 (1997).

__ Exception
~
In Dinitz and Jam, the Court recognized an exception to
this rule. A retrial would be barred when the prosecutor's
conduct is in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing the
defendant. Later, in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676
(1982), the Court rejected this standard as too amorphous.
In its place, the majority adopted a standard which bars retrial only when the prosecutorial conduct which gives rise to
a defendant's motion for mistrial is intended to provoke the
defendant into moving for a mistrial.
On cross-examination of the state's expert witness in
Kennedy, the defense attempted to establish the witness's
bias by questioning him about an unrelated criminal complaint he had filed against the defendant. The prosecutor
sought to rehabilitate the witness on redirect by asking
whether the witness had ever done business with the defendant. When the witness responded in the negative, the
prosecutor asked, "Is that because he is a crook?" /d. at
667. At that moment, the defense attorney had to choose
between the possibility of a prejudiced jury or waiver of his
client's right to a verdict from that jury. The Oregon Court of
Appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that it was not
the intent of the prosecutor to cause a mistrial. Nevertheless, the Oregon court held that retrial was barred because
the prosecutor's conduct, "a direct personal attack on the
general character of the defendant;' was "overreaching."
The Court, per (then) Justice Rehnquist, held that "overreaching" is an overly expansive standard and reversed.
r :The Court felt that allowing double jeopardy to act as a bar
would not necessarily aid the defendant. Justice Rehnquist
declared, "Knowing that the granting of the defendant's motion for mistrial would all but inevitably bring with it an attempt to bar a second trial on grounds of double jeopardy,
the judge presiding over the first trial might well be more
loath to grant a defendant's motion for mistrial." /d. at 676.
In State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 70, 641 N.E.2d 1082
(1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120 (1995), the Ohio
Supreme Court applied this rule: "Only where the prosecutorial conduct in question is intended.to 'goad' the defendant
into moving for a mistrial may defendant raise the bar of
double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in
aborting the first on his own motion:· The Court went to find
that there "is no indication that the state engaged in an intentional act of deception, or that the state intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence."

Unavailable Witnesses
In Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a conviction at a
second trial where the judge at the first trial had granted the
government's motion for a mistrial when it was discovered,
after the jury had already been impaneled, that a key prosecution witness had not been located. The trial court discharged the jury over the objection of the defendant, and a
second jury was impaneled two days later, after the prosecution located the witness.
The Court in Downum found a lack of manifest necessity
to discontinue the first trial. The Court held that when a jury
is impaneled and the prosecutor is aware or should be
aware of the unavailability of a key prosecution witness, discharge of the jury - even if no evidence has been presented at that point- constitutes jeopardy. However, the Court
declined to make an absolute rule, stating that each case
must be decided on its own facts. The Court based its finding of lack of manifest necessity in Downum on the trial
court's failure to consider available alternatives, such as a
reasonable continuance until the key witness was located or
granting the defense's motion to dismiss the two counts in
the indictment for which the missing witness would have
provided critical testimony.
Subsequent cases have read Downum to prohibit a retrial
where the failure to produce the key witness can be attributed to faulty arrangements by the prosecution. However,
where a properly subpoenaed witness fails to appear
through no fault of the prosecution, and there are no viable
alternatives, retrial will be allowed. See Schulhofer,
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451 (1977).
Defective Indictment
'
In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that where an indictment suffers from a
fatal defect and no other alternatives are present but to declare a mistrial, a second trial is not barred. After the jury
was sworn but before any evidence was presented, the
prosecutor realized the indictment was fatally defective for
failing to allege the requisite intent, i.e., permanently deprive
the owner of his property. Moreover, Illinois only permitted
amending an indictment to cure formal defects, which this
omission was not. Further proceedings under the defective
indictment would have resulted in a reversal of any conviction on appeal. Faced with this prospect, the trial court
granted the prosecution's motion and declared a mistrial.
The defendant was re-indicted and convicted after the new
trial.

MANIFEST NECESSITY
Hung Juries
Hung juries are the most common cause of mistrials.
The standards governing reprosecution following a mistrial
were set forth in an 1824 hung jury decision, United States
v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). See also Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1892). The Court in Perez
stated, "We think ... the law has invested Courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict,
1 whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." /d.
at 580.
The jury in Richardson v. United S~ates, 468 U.S. 317
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In Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), the
trial judge, in the middle of the trial, directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that even
if the judge's decision was erroneous, it nevertheless was a
final judgment and could not be reviewed without subjecting
the defendants to double jeopardy. Similarly, in United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), the
Court ruled that if the judge enters a judgment of acquittal
under Federal Criminal Rule 29(c} before the jury reaches a
verdict, the government may not retry the defendant. Martin
Linen was distinguished from an earlier case, United States
v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), in which a trial judge had declared a mistrial because of a hung jury. The Court in
Martin Linen distinguished the two cases on the ground that
Sanford did not involve a judgment of acquittal under Rule
29(c). In sum, when a lower court makes a determination
on the merits, retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

At first glance, Somerville seemed to fall within the rule
set forth in Downum. Both cases involved prosecutors who
moved for a mistrial because of their own errors. However,
the Downum error could have been corrected by granting a
continuance to enable the prosecution to locate its witness,
while a mistrial was the only alternative available in
Somerville. The Court held that the "ends of public justice"
outweighed the defendant's interest in proceeding to averdict with the first jury. Therefore, under a showing of manifest necessity, the declaration of a mistrial was proper.
Defense Counsel Misconduct
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided that when a mistrial
is declared due to defense counsel misconduct, a showing
of manifest necessity is not an absolute requirement. In
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), a defendant's
first murder conviction was reversed because the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense. During
defense counsel's opening statement at the second trial, he
disclosed to the jury that the state's withholding of information had caused the new trial. The prosecutor objected and
moved for a mistrial on the ground that the defense attorney's misconduct could not be remedied. The mistrial was
granted, and t_he defendant was subsequently convicted at a
third trial. The Supreme Court affirmed this conviction despite the failure of the trial judge to expressly find a manifest
necessity for the mistrial or to consider other alternatives.
According to the Court, it is within the trial judge's discretion
to determine if a statement by defense counsel might have
created juror bias. The Court made clear, however, that its
relaxed review of the proceedings would be inappropriate in
cases where the mistrial had been caused by the conduct of
a prosecutor.
In State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 190, 429 N.E.2d
1065 (1981 ), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982}, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte. In Widner, the
defendant's attorneys were found in contempt and removed
from the courtroom after the jury had been sworn and opening statements had been made. When the defendant then
stated that he no longer wished to appear in front of the
judge, he was found in contempt, and the judge declared a
mistrial. The case was tried subsequently before a new trial
judge. The defendant entered a plea of no contest. On appeal, he claimed the second trial violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the conviction on three grounds: (i) there was a "high degree of necessity" for the mistrial; (2) there were no viable alternatives;
and (3) a mistrial would best serve the public interest in justice.

New Trial Motion
In Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981 ), the Supreme
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause had been violated when Louisiana reprosecuted a defendant for first-degree murdeJ after the defendant's new trial motion had been
granted. The Court stated that when a new trial is granted
because the state has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the new trial is barred. The Court, however,
indicated that the result would have been different if the trial
judge had granted the motion as a "13th juror'' because he
entertained personal doubts about the verdict.
Demurrer
In Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986), the defense filed a demurrer to several counts, and the trial judge
sustained the demurrer. The prosecutor appealed the trial
judge's decision. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
that the appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause because a demurrer involves a pure question of law,
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. The United States
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a demurrer was the
functional equivalent of an acquittal and therefore barred a
prosecution appeal or any other further proceedings. The
key point is not the name of the motion or ruling, but
whether the trial court is making a directed-verdict- insufficiency ruling.
Appeals of Directed Verdicts
The Court has indicated, however, that there can be an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered post-trial. In
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 n. 7 (1978), the Court
stated: "In Jenkins we had assumed that a judgment of acquittal could be appealed where no retrial would be needed
on remand . . . . Despite the Court's heavy emphasis on the
finality of an acquittal in Martin Linen and Sanabria, neither
decision explicitly repudiates this assumption." In this situation, the critical point is that a retrial is not necessary; if the
appellate court disagrees with the trial court, the original
verdict can be reinstated without a new trial.

ACQUITTALS
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution if a defendant has been acquitted. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896). Directed verdicts are treated the same as
acquittals. An appellate court's decision to reverse for insufficient evidence is also the functional equivalent of an acquittal. Both of these issues are discussed below.

DISMISSALS
Dismissals on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence after jeopardy has attached have proved troublesome, with the United States Supreme Court changing its
position. Originally, in 1975, the Court in United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}, held that a dismissal differs
from a mistrial because, in essence, a dismissal represents

DIRECTED VERDICTS
Directed verdicts (Grim. R. 29) are treated the same as
acquittals and bar reprosecution. As discussed in the next
section, dismissals do not bar retrial. The label given to the
trial court's decision is not determinative; rather, the basis of
the decision controls.
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a termination in favor of a defendant. Jenkins was charged
with refusing to submit to induction in the armed forces. The
trial court dismissed the indictment because the selective
service board had failed to consider the defendant's application for conscientious objector status. The Supreme Court
~.. did not determine whether the trial court's judgment constituted a resolution of the factual issues against the government and would not consider the correctness of the ruling.
In the Court's view, double jeopardy barred further proceedings after a dismissal favorable to the defendant.
Several years later, the Court modified Jenkins. In Lee v.
United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977), the Court said that a retrial was not barred where the trial judge, after a two-hour
bench trial, dismissed the indictment for failure to allege the
specific intent required by statute, even though the judge felt
the defendant's guilt had been proven. The Court pointed
out that, as in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), the
only reason a conviction could not be permitted in Lee was
because the indictment had been improperly drafted. The
Court stressed that "the order entered by the District Court
was functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mistrial .... The error, like any prosecutorial or judicial error
that necessitates a mistrial, was one that could be avoided
- absent any double jeopardy bar- by beginning anew
the prosecution of the defendant:' 432 U.S. at 30-31.
The final demise of Jenkins occurred in 1978 in United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978). There, at the close
of the evidence, the trial court dismissed two of three counts
because of prejudicial preindictment delay. The jury acquitted the defendant on the third count. The Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, overruled Jenkins and held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar appeal or reprosecution "where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the
' trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence:' Thus, Scott limited double jeopardy protection to
favorable judgments on the merits, while Jenkins had enunciated a broader rule that any termination favorable to a defendant after jeopardy attached barred reprosecution.

sexual assault charge was permissible.

Disparate Verdicts
If the accused is tried on two criminal charges, one resulting in a verdict of not guilty and the other a verdict of
guilty, a reversal of the guilty verdict does not nullify the fav?ra_ble judgment on the other offense. The not guilty verdict 1s untouchable; only the charge on which the conviction
was reversed may be retried. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).

Implied Acquittals; Lesser Included Offenses
By returning a guilty verdict to a lesser offense, the jury
has acquitted the defendant of the greater offense, and his
appeal of the lesser conviction does not constitute a waiver
of double jeopardy on the greater offense. Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323
(1970). Accordingly, if the conviction on the lesser offense is
reversed, the defendant may be retried for the lesser, but
not the greater, offense.
·

Insufficient Evidence
In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Greene
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
reversal on appealt?ecause of the insufficiency of the evidence is, in effect, an acquittal and bars retrial. Reversal
under such circumstances means that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury because the prosecution
failed, as a matter of law, to present sufficient evidence to
justify a guilty verdict.
In Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), the defendant
was sentenced to an enhanced prison term under a state
habitual offender statute. The statute became operative if a
defendant had been convicted of four prior offenses. In a
later habeas proceeding, the defendant was able to show
that one of the prior convictions had been the subject of a
pardon, and thus could not be used for enhancement. The
State, however, announced that it would introduce a different conviction, which it had not previously used, to bring the
defendant within the recidivist statute. The defendant objected on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that without the
pardoned conviction, there was insufficient evidence- in
effect, an acquittal on the recidivist count.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that a retrial is
not barred when a conviction is set aside because certain
evidence was erroneously admitted, even when the reviewin~ court determines that without the erroneously admitted
ev1dence there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction - provided that the sum of the trial evidence, whether
erroneously admitted or not, would have been sufficient to
sustain a guilty verdict. Burks was based on a distinction
between reversals involving trial errors and those involving
insufficient evidence. In Nelson, the reversal was based on
a trial error, and a retrial would afford the accused the
opportunity to obtain a fair readjudication of guilt free from
error. Moreover, had he successfully objected to the inadmissible evidence at trial, the prosecutor would have had
the opportunity to introduce a different prior conviction to
support the recidivist charge.

RETRIALS AFTER APPELLATE REVERSALS
With the exception of reversals based on the insufficiency
of evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar reprosecution of defendants who have successfully appealed
the_ir convictions. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896);
Umted States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). Two theories
have been advanced to support this rule: (1) the defendant
by appealing waives the double jeopardy protection; or (2)
the defendant is in "continued jeopardy" until the trial is finalized.
For example, in Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987), the
defendant was convicted of incest of his stepdaughter.
During the appellate process, the State discovered that the
incest statute had not applied to stepchildren at the time of
the crime. An amendment to the statute, which included
stepchildren, became effective three months after the incident in question. The Montana Supreme Court reversed
Hall's conviction on ex post facto grounds and also conclud~d that a retrial for sexual assault was precluded because
1ncest and sexual assault were the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. The United States Supreme Court
· r~versed. The successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the sufficiency of the evidence, does not bar further proceedings for the same offense. Since Hall's conviction was reversed on ex post facto
grounds, rather than for insufficient evidence, a retrial on the

Weight of the Evidence
In Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 {1982), the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, distinguished between reversals
based on insufficient evidence and reversals based on the
"weight of the evidence." Reversal of a conviction based on
the weight of the evidence does not preclude retrial on double jeopardy grounds. A reversal for legal insufficiency is
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this case. Two additional witnesses at the retrial provided
information concerning the defendant's participation in the
crime. Evidence of a prior conviction, unknown at the first
trial, also supported the imposition of an increased sentence.
If the possibility of vindictiveness is absent, as where the ,
second sentence is imposed by a jury that is unaware of the
first sentence, the higher sentence is permissible. Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).

like an acquittal because it means that no rational fact-finder
could have voted to convict the defendant, and that the state
should not have a second chance to prove what it had failed
to prove at the first trial. In contrast, a reversal on the
weight of the evidence signifies only the appellate court's
disagreement with the verdict. The Court suggested that
the appellate court be viewed as a "thirteenth juror" and its
disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence is no
different from a disagreement among the jurors themselves.
The Court reasoned, "A reversal based on the weight of evidence, moreover, can occur only after the State both has
presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and has
persuaded the jury to convict." In that instance, the "reversal
simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a
favorable judgment:' /d. 43.

!'

Capital Cases
The United States Supreme Court has treated the death
penalty differently from other sentences. In Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981 ), the Court refused to
allow a retrial to impose the death penalty when the first trial
jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at a separate presentence hearing. The Court reasoned: "The presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue
of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes:'
Allowing the state in Bullington to have a second chance to
prove the aggravating circumstances necessary to invoke
the death penalty would have been the equivalent of allowing reprosecution for the same offense.
See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984); Poland
v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S.
222 (1994).

RESENTENCING AT RETRIAL
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969),
the Supreme Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy
nor Equal Protection Clauses precluded an increased sentence on retrial following a successful appeal. In other
words, the "slate has been wiped clean" by the reversal.
The Court, however, also held that due process precludes
increased sentences wheFJ the increase is motivated by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge:
Due Process of law ... requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked
his first conviction· must play no part in the sentence
he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that
a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge

PROSECUTION APPEALS
In 1907, Congress authorized government appeals in limited circumstances, e.g., where an indictment is dismissed
on the basis of the invalidity or construction of a statute.
.
That authority was expanded by the Criminal Appeals Act of \..
1971, 18 U.S.C 3731, permitting government appeals from
any decision dismissing an indictment, except where the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits further prosecution. In
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that the government may appeal a dismissal of a
federal prosecution without offending the Double Jeopardy
Clause, except when the dismissal is a judgment of acquittal
relating to the defendant's factual innocence. A successful
appeal by the government of a dismissal can now result in
reprosecution or in reinstatement of a verdict of guilty if the
dismissal followed such a verdict. United States v. Wilson,
420 U.S. 332 (1975).

In order to assure the absence of such a motivation,
we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a
more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. /d. at 725-26.
Thus, an increased sentence on retrial is presumptively vindictive, but this presumption may be rebutted by reasons set
forth in the record.
The defendant in Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559
(1984), was convicted of making a false statement in a
passport application and sentenced to a 2-year partially
suspended sentence with probation. After his conviction
was overturned, he was retried and convicted. This time he
was sentenced to two years imprisonment, none of which
was suspended. The Supreme Court found the presumption of vindictiveness applicable. It also found, however, that
the record contained reasons that rebutted the presumption
- namely, an intervening conviction. The increased punishment resulted from a conviction for a different crime, which
was adjudged after the first trial.
The defendant in Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134
(1986), was convicted of murder and sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. He was
tried again and convicted. This time he received a 50-year
prison term. The Court held that Pearce was not violated in

APPEALS OF SENTENCES
Increasing a sentence on review poses different double
jeopardy considerations. Unlike acquittals, criminal sentences are not final judgments and, therefore, double jeopardy does not bar an increase of a sentence on review. In
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), a divided Supreme Court allowed the government to appeal a sentence it perceived as too lenient against a defendant found
to be a "dangerous special offender" under the Organized
Crime Control Act. According to the Court, double jeopardy
protections prevent reprosecution after a final judgment of
acquittal has been reached. Therefore, government appeal
of a sentence does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,
since it poses no threat of reprosecution for the same of\
tense.
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